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Abstract—For conventional secret sharing, if cheaters can
submit possibly forged shares after observing shares of the honest
users in the reconstruction phase, they can disturb the protocol
and only they can reconstruct the true secret. To overcome the
problem, secret sharing schemes with properties of the cheater-
identification have been proposed. Existing protocols for cheater-
identifiable secret sharing have assumed non-rushing cheaters
or honest majority. In this paper, using message authentication,
we remove both conditions simultaneously, and give its universal
construction from any secret sharing scheme. To resolve this end,
we explicitly propose the concepts of “individual identification”
and “agreed identification”. For both settings, we provide proto-
cols for cheater-identifiable secret sharing. In our protocols, the
security parameter can be set independently to the share size
and the underlying finite field size.
Index Terms—secret sharing, universal construction, rushing
cheater, cheater-identification, without honest majority, message
authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a basic primitive for secure information
transmission [23]. It involves a dealer who has a secret S in
the secret space S and a set of players. The dealer divides
the secret S into n shares and distributes the shares to n
players such that if a set of players is qualified then all the
players in the set can reconstruct the secret and if the set of
players is not qualified then any player in the set cannot obtain
any information about the secret. In case of (k, n)-threshold
scheme, any set of k players can be qualified. Generally, a
family A of subsets of {1, . . . , n}, denoted by [n], is the access
structure of a secret sharing protocol when all the players in
each subsets in A can reconstruct the secret S and others
cannot learn anything about it. It is known that when a family
A of subsets is closed with respect to the union operation,
there exists a secret sharing protocol whose access structure is
A [12], [3], [13], [14], [4], [5]. Further, when a non-qualified
set of players obtains a part of information, these schemes
are called non-perfect. If a non-perfect scheme has certain
threshold properties, then it is called a ramp scheme [2], [28],
[8].
For conventional secret sharing protocols, it is assumed that
everyone involved in the protocols is honest or semi-honest.
However, in a real scenario, some applicants may maliciously
behave in the execution of the protocol. In particular, a part
of players may submit incorrect shares so as to yield an
incorrect secret in the reconstruction phase. To overcome the
problem, additional properties to conventional secret sharing
have been considered and new schemes such as cheater-
detectable secret sharing (CDSS) [24] and cheater-identifiable
secret sharing (CISS) [19] have been proposed. Here, a player
that submits incorrect shares is called a cheater. A protocol is
called a (t, ǫ)-cheater-detectable secret sharing (CDSS) when
it detects the existence of cheaters among players involved in
the reconstruction phase with probability 1− ǫ at least under
the condition that the number of cheaters is not greater than t.
A protocol is called a (t, ǫ)-cheater-identifiable secret sharing
(CISS) when it identifies who submitted incorrect shares with
probability 1− ǫ at least under the condition that the number
of cheaters is not greater than t.
Even in the setting of CISS, cheaters may submit their
shares incorrectly after observing shares of honest players.
Such cheaters is called rushing cheaters. The papers [22], [26],
[27], [1] proposed CISS protocols to properly works against
such rushing cheaters. To achieve this task, their sharing phase
is composed of two rounds. Unfortunately, these protocols
cannot identify the cheaters when the number of cheaters
is more than half of players involved in the reconstruction
phase. In this situation, only the protocol in [1] can detect
the existence of cheaters without identifying them. Ishai et al
[11] proposed another CISS protocol identifying them even
when the number of cheaters is more than half of players
involved in the reconstruction phase. To achieve this task, they
propose a locally-identifiable secret sharing (LISS), in which
a server identifies the cheaters instead of each player, but their
LISS is not robust against rushing cheaters. In their protocol,
the players submit their shares to the server, and the server
recovers the secret and identifies the cheaters for each player.
While the server sends each player an information to identify
the cheaters, this information depends on the player. That is,
this information is correct only when the player is honest.
Hence, their identifications do not agree in this protocol.
In a real scenario, it is not easy to prepare the server.
Therefore, it is strongly required to propose a protocol to
identify the rushing cheaters even when more than half of the
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COMPARISON OF PROPOSED CISS PROTOCOL FOR INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION WITH EXISTING CISS PROTOCOLS
Number of
Rushing
Universal
Efficiency Flexibility
Large
Cheaters Construction Finite Field
[21] t < n′/2 = n/2 No No O(ℓ log ℓ) Yes Needless
[11] t < n′ = n No Yes O(ℓ log ℓ) No Needless
[22], [26], [27] t < n′/2 = k/2 Yes No O(ℓ log ℓ) No Need
[1] t < n′/2 = k/2 Yes No O(ℓ log ℓ) Yes Need
Proposed t < n′ Yes Yes O(ℓ log ℓ) Yes Needless
n is the number of the players. n′ is the number of the applicants. t is the number of the cheaters. k is the number of qualified players. 1 − 2−ℓ is the
successful probability to identify the cheaters. Efficiency shows the computational complexity of the protocol. Flexibility is the independence of the choice
of the security parameter ℓ from the secret size or the form of original protocol.
players involved in the reconstruction phase are cheaters. In
this paper, to resolve this problem, we explicitly propose the
concepts of “individual identification” and “agreed identifica-
tion”. A CISS protocol with individual identification privately
identifies the cheaters so that the identification depends on
individual players. A CISS protocol with agreed identification
commonly identifies the cheaters so that the identification is
independent of the player. The difference between these two
types of protocols is based on whether their identifications
agree or not. The protocol in [11] belongs to the former, and
the protocols in [22], [26], [27], [1] do to the latter. In the
case of CDSS protocols, we do not have to care about the
difference because it is not advantageous for CDSS protocols
to individually detect the existence of the cheaters.
In this paper, we propose a CISS protocol with individual
identification as well as a CISS protocol with agreed identifica-
tion. Both protocols well work even against rushing cheaters,
and the latter is composed of two rounds as well as the protocol
in [1]. The former can identify the cheaters even when more
than half of the players involved in the reconstruction phase
are cheaters. The latter can detect the existence of the cheaters
under the same situation, but can identify the cheaters only
when less than half of the players in the reconstruction phase
are cheaters. When less than half of the players involved in the
reconstruction phase are cheaters, even the latter can identify
the cheaters. This performance is the same as the protocol
given in [1].
Next, we discuss the construction of protocols. Algebraic
structures underlie many CISS protocols [22], [26], [27], [1]
as in the original construction by Shamir. They are limited to
(k, n)-threshold scheme protocols. However, so many efficient
secret sharing protocols were proposed when the size of secret
is large [28], [13], [2], [7].
Protocols with general access structures were constructed
[12], [3], [13]. Also, ramp-type secret sharing protocols were
constructed [2], [28]. Such general secret sharing protocols
were not used to in these CISS protocols. Hence, it is desired
to construct a CISS protocol by converting an existing secret
sharing protocol. Such a construction is called a universal
construction. The protocol in [11] is universal in this sense.
But, it was constructed by converting an existing secret sharing
protocol only when the share is given as an element of a finite
field. So, to make the scheme more secure, it needs a finite
field of larger size.
For a precise analysis, we need to distinguish a player
wishing to open the secret so called an applicant from a
qualified player because the set of applicants contains cheaters,
while some of existing studies [1], [22], [26], [27] assume that
they are identical. Hence, the protocol needs to work well
when the set of applicants is larger than the set of qualified
players. To satisfy this requirement, we characterize qualified
players by general access structure, and universally construct
our protocols from an existing arbitrary secret sharing protocol
with general access structure when the share is given as
an element of vector space of a finite field. Our universal
construction of CISS for both settings employs the method of
the message authentication based on universal-2 hash function
[15], [18]. That is, we attach the message authentication [15],
[18] to the share of the existing secret sharing protocol. Then,
the identification can be realized by checking whether the
share is original. Hence, our construction does not require a
finite field of large size.
From a practical viewpoint, we need to care about the com-
putational complexity of the protocol. A protocol is efficient
when its computational complexity is not so large. When the
players identify the cheaters with probability 1 − 2−ℓ where
ℓ is the security parameter, the computational complexity of
the protocols given in [1] is O(ℓ log ℓ). When the protocol
is universally constructed, the total computational complexity
depends on the original secret sharing protocol. In this case, we
focus on computational complexity except for the part of the
original protocol. In this sense, the computational complexity
of the protocol in [11] is O(ℓ log ℓ), and that of our protocol
is also O(ℓ log ℓ).
In general, the security parameter ℓ may depend on the
other parameters for the protocols. In the protocols in [22],
[26], [27], the security parameter ℓ depends on the size of
secret. On the other hand, it is desirable to flexibly choose
the security parameter ℓ. We call a protocol flexible, when the
security parameter ℓ can be set independently, i.e., independent
of the secret size. Flexibility provides the power of partial
customization of length of random strings, according to the
requirement. The protocol in [1] can flexibly choose the
security parameter ℓ by adjusting the finite field with prime
size. Also, the protocol in [11] can flexibly choose the security
parameter ℓ by adjusting the finite field appearing in the
original protocol. Although these protocols offer the flexibility,
the security parameter ℓ depends on the size of the finite
field. The above computational complexity O(ℓ log ℓ) can be
realized by suitable choices of the size of the finite field
3in these protocols [10]. Hence, the choice of the security
parameter ℓ has a certain restriction when we keep the com-
putational complexity O(ℓ log ℓ). Therefore, it is desirable to
completely freely choose the security parameter ℓ. Fortunately,
our protocol works with any finite field, and the security
parameter ℓ can be freely chosen independently of the size
of the finite field and the secret size. Therefore, our protocol
is completely flexible and works even with finite field F2,
which simplifies the realization. Overall, the comparison of the
performances of existing protocols with ours is summarized as
Table I.
The remaining part of this paper is as follows. Section II
gives basic tools and formal definitions. Section III gives our
CISS protocol for individual identification. Section IV shows
its security. Section V gives our CISS protocols for agreed
identification and detection. Section VI compares the overhead
of ours with those of existing protocols.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
If A is a finite set, a ← A means that an element a
is uniformly chosen from A. If A is a probability distri-
bution, a ← A means that a is chosen according to A.
If A is a probabilistic algorithm, A(·) can be regarded as
a probability distribution. Thus, a ← A(·) can be defined
as in the case of probability distributions. For any event E
depending on a random variable A, Pra←A[E] means that∑
a∈supp(A) Pr[A = a] · Pr[E | A = a].
B. Universal Hash Functions
As mentioned, our universal construction uses message
authentication protocols [15], [18] in which universal hash
functions are used. A family H of hash functions hi : A→ B
is said to be universal-2 if for any a ∈ A and b ∈ B
Pr
hi←H
[hi(a) = b] =
1
|B|
holds, where the probability is over the uniformly random
choice of hi from H. The original definition of universal-2
hash functions and several constructions can be found in [25].
C. Toeplitz Matrices
An (n × m)-Toeplitz matrix T = (Ti,j) over Fq can be
determined by s = s1s2 · · · sn+m−1 ∈ F
n+m−1
q \ {0
n+m−1}
as follows: Set Tn,1 = s1, . . . , T1,1 = sn (for the first column)
and T1,2 = sn+1, . . . , T1,m = sn+m−1 (for the first row).
The remaining entries can be set so as to satisfy that Ti,j =
Ti−1,j−1 for any i and j with 2 ≤ i ≤ n and 2 ≤ j ≤ m.
That is, T can be written as
T =


sn sn+1 sn+2 · · · sn+m−1
sn−1 sn sn+1 · · · sn+m−2
sn−2 sn−1 sn · · · sn+m−3
...
...
...
. . .
...
s1 s2 s3 · · · sm


.
The matrix T represents a linear map from Fmq to F
n
q . If
n < m, T can be regarded as a hash function indexed by
s. It is known that Toeplitz matrices work as universal-2 hash
functions with short description.
Proposition 1: Let Hm,n = {(m × n)-Toeplitz matrix T
determined by s | s ∈ Fn+m−1q \ {0
n+m−1}}, where n < m.
Then Hm,n is a family of universal-2 hash functions from
F
m
q \ {0
m} to Fnq .
We would like to remark that universal-2 hash functions
based on Toeplitz matrices are advantageous. In general,
universal-2 hash functions require the uniform distribution
over the hash function class H. Even if there is a bias in
the distribution over H in the sense of [20], the resulting hash
functions are still “almost” universal [15]. This property of the
robustness is applicable to our results in this paper, although
we do not discuss this matter any more.
D. Secret Sharing
A secret sharing protocol (Sh,Rc) consists of two subpro-
tocols Sh and Rc. The dealer, having a secret s in the secret
space S, initiates the sharing protocol Sh. At the end of Sh,
the i-th player for each i ∈ [n] obtains his share vi in the
share space V . In the standard secret sharing schemes, Sh is
just a non-interactive protocol (say, a probabilistic algorithm),
which takes s ∈ S as input and produces v1, . . . , vn. After
producing n shares, the dealer sends vi to the i-th player for
each i ∈ [n]. We may regard Sh as a (probabilistic) function
from S to Vn.
Usually, Rc is defined as an algorithm which takes a subset
of all the shares with players’ indices as input and tries to
recover the secret s. In the real situation, if a player wishes to
recover the secret, he should declare his wish to do that and
collet shares from the other players that also wish to recover
the secret. We call such players applicants. If the set of all the
applicants is so-called qualified, the reconstruction algorithm
should recover the secret s. Otherwise, the secret should not be
recovered. The qualification can be defined in terms of access
structures. An access structure A is a monotone collection of
sets of players. Any set A is said to be qualified if and only if
A ∈ A. Moreover, if A′ ⊃ A for a qualified set A, A′ should
be also qualified. In this paper, we do not give definitions of the
correctness of the reconstruction algorithm. This is because our
results are transformations from a underlying secret sharing
scheme to another scheme with the cheater identification. The
resulting scheme inherits the correctness property and the
access structure from the underlying scheme. For example,
if the underlying scheme has the perfect correctness then the
resulting scheme also has the perfect correctness, and if the
underlying scheme is a ramp scheme then the resulting scheme
is also a ramp scheme.
As mentioned, the applicants declare their wish to recover
the secret. Before executing the reconstruction algorithm, the
applicants must collect shares to feed the algorithm with by
invoking some preparation protocol. Normally in the prepara-
tion phase, applicants may publish their shares or send them
to each other. In our universal constructions, we will explicitly
mention the preparation phase.
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Fig. 1. A Case of majority cheaters. A white circle expresses a honest player and black circles express cheaters.
E. Cheater Identifiability and Detectability
Let P be a set of players and P can be usually identified
with [n]. Reconstruction algorithms for the standard secret
sharing schemes can be regarded as a map from 2P×V to
S ∪ {⊥} where ⊥ denotes a failure of the reconstruction.
On the other hand, reconstruction algorithms for cheater-
identifiable schemes are regarded as a map from 2P×V to
(S∪{⊥})×2P . That is, Rc outputs (s′, L) where s′ ∈ S∪{⊥}
and L is a subset (or list) of applicants. We expect that s′ = s
and L is the list of all cheating applicants.
To give formal definitions of the cheater identifiability, we
consider the following experiment ExpA for the adversary
A = (A1,A2).
1. s← S;
2. (v1, ..., vn)← Sh(s);
3. B ← the set of honest applicants;
/* Honest applicants declare their wish
to recover the secret. */
4. (C, state)← A1(B);
/* C is the set of applicants corrupted by A
satisfying B ∩ C = ∅ */
5. Honest applicants send their shares {vi}i∈B
to the other applicants (including corrupted ones);
6. Corrupted applicants forge their shares by
computing {v′i,j}i∈C,j∈B ← A2({vi}i∈B∪C , state)
and send {v′i,j}i∈C to the j-th honest applicant
for each j ∈ B;
7. Honest applicants individually execute the
reconstruction algorithm as {Outj}j∈B ←
{Rc({i, ui,j}i∈B∪C)}j∈B , where ui,j = vi
if i ∈ B and ui,j = v
′
i,j otherwise.
In the above, the output Outj of the reconstruction algorithm
executed by the j-th applicant is of the form (s′, Lj,A). Let
Ei,j,A for each i ∈ B ∪ C and j ∈ B be the event that i is
not included in the list Lj,A The event Ei,j,A means that the
j-the applicant does not consider the i-th applicant corrupted
by the adversary A.
Definition 1: A secret sharing scheme (Sh,Rc) is (t, ε)-
cheater-identifiable for individual identification if the follow-
ing condition holds. For any adversary A which collapses at
most t players and for any two distinct applicants i, j,
• Pr[Ei,j,A] ≤ ε if the j-th applicant is honest and the i-
th applicant submits a forged share v′i,j 6= vi to the j-th
applicant.
• Pr[Ei,j,A] = 1 if the j-th applicant is honest and the i-th
applicant submits the original share v′i,j = vi to the j-th
applicant.
Definition 2: A secret sharing scheme (Sh,Rc) is (t, ε)-
cheater-identifiable for agreed identification if for every ad-
versary A who collapses at most t players and always forges
shares and for any two distinct applicants i, j, the same
conditions as in Definition 1 hold and all lists Lj,A for honest
applicants j coincide with each other.
Definition 3: A secret sharing scheme (Sh,Rc) is (t, ε)-
cheater-detectable if for every adversary A who collapses at
most t parties, there exists a honest applicant j such that
Pr[Lj,A = ∅] ≤ ε if the j-th applicant receives forged shares.
III. PROTOCOL FOR INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION
Let n be the number of players and ℓ′ be the security
parameter, which is independent of the structure of the original
secret sharing protocol. We will construct our protocol so
that the verifier (honest applicant) identifies the cheater with
probability more than 1−q−ℓ
′
. While our construction is given
by attaching the message authentication protocol [15], [18] to
the share of an existing secret sharing protocol like [22], it
works with an arbitrary existing secret sharing protocol.
Let (Sh,Rc) be a secret sharing protocol realizing access
structure A with Sh : S → Vn, where V is m-dimensional
vector space Fmq over a finite filed Fq . Here, the access
structure A expresses the condition for a subset of [n] to
recover the secret S ∈ S. To present our CISS protocol for
individual identification based on the protocol (Sh,Rc), we
make preparation as follows. We employ message authenti-
cation based on Toeplitz matrices, which are often used in
cryptography (e.g., hard-core functions [9] and universal hash
functions [15], [16]). For a secret S ∈ S, we define the random
numberXi := Shi(S) where Shi(S) is the projection of Sh(S)
onto the i-th coordinate, as the share of the i-th player, which
is sent by the dealer. For i 6= j, the dealer independently
generates n(n − 1) random numbers Zj,i taking values in
F
ℓ′
q . Also, the dealer independently generates ℓ
′ ×m Toeplitz
5matrix Tj . Then, the dealer calculates the random number
Yj,i := TjXi + Zj,i. Now, we give our CISS protocol for
individual identification as Protocol 1. Due to the construction
of Protocol 1, we find that its computational complexity is
O(ℓ′ log ℓ′).
Protocol 1 CISS protocol for individual identification
STEP 1: [Dealing] For each j ∈ [n], the dealer sends
the j-th player the publishable information (Xj , Z1,j , . . . ,
Zj−1,j , Zj+1,j . . . , Zn,j) and the identification-information
(Tj , Yj,1, . . . , Yj,j−1, Yj,j+1, . . . , Yj,n).
STEP 2: [Sharing] The applicants send their publishable in-
formation as follows. The i-th player sends (Xi, Zj,i) to the
j-th player.
STEP 3: [Identification] The j-th player checks whether the
relation
Yj,i = TjX
′
i + Z
′
j,i (1)
holds, where the information received from the i-th player
is (X ′i, Z
′
j,i), which is the same process as the verification
of the message authentication [15], [18].
STEP 4: [Reconstruction] If the set of the players verified by
the j-th player to be honest satisfies the access structure A,
the j-th player reconstructs the secret from the collection
of X ′i of players verified to be honest.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As our security analysis, we show the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let n′ be the number of applicants. Protocol 1 is
an (n′−1, q−ℓ
′
)-CISS protocol for individual identification re-
alizing access structure A with secret space S and share space
Si = F
(2n−1)ℓ′+2m−1
q . Further, if the set of honest players
satisfies the access structure A. each player can reconstruct
the secret S ∈ S
Proof: Since the function (Xi, Zj,i) 7→ TjXi + Zj,i is a
universal-2 hash function with the randomly chosen Toeplitz
matrix Tj , the relation (1) holds with probability smaller than
q−ℓ
′
if the j-th player makes a cheat. Therefore, even though
all of players except for the i-th player makes cheating even
with collusion, the i-th player can identify who makes cheating
with high probability as Fig. 1.
Also, even though several players collude together, they
cannot obtain any information for the shares by other players
as follows. To see this fact, we assume that the j1-th player,
the j2-th player, ..., the ja-th player collude together. We focus
on the information on Xi shared by the i-th player. Since
Zj,i is independent and uniform, Yj1,i, Yj2,i, . . . , Yja,i are
independent of Tj1Xi, Tj1Xi, . . . , TjaXi. Since they obtain
no information for Tj1Xi, Tj1Xi, . . . , TjaXi, they obtain no
information on Xi.
Thus, if the original protocol with shares Xi works as secret
sharing well, our protocol also works as secret sharing well
at least with probability 1 − q−ℓ
′
. Therefore, we obtain the
desired statement.
V. PROTOCOL FOR AGREED IDENTIFICATION
Now, we can give our CISS protocol for agreed identifica-
tion as Protocol 2.
Protocol 2 CISS protocol for agreed identification
STEP 1: [Dealing] For each j ∈ [n], the dealer sends
the j-th player the publishable information (Xj , Z1,j , . . . ,
Zj−1,j , Zj+1,j . . . , Zn,j) and the identification-information
(Tj , Yj,1, . . . , Yj,j−1, Yj,j+1, . . . , Yj,n).
STEP 2: [Sharing (Round 1)] The applicants send their pub-
lishable information.
STEP 3: [Sharing (Round 2)] The applicants send their
identification-information.
STEP 4: [Identification] Each player applies respective in-
dividual identification. We employ the majority voting of
the results of respective individual identification. That is,
if ⌈(n′ − 1)/2⌉ players agree to identify the set of honest
players, the set is identified to the set of players identified
to be honest.
STEP 5: [Reconstruction] If the above set of players identi-
fied to be honest satisfies the access structure A, the players
reconstruct the secret from the collection of X ′i of players
verified to be honest.
Since the majority voting of the results of respective indi-
vidual verifications identifies (as shown in Theorem 1) who
makes cheating if more than half of the players wishing the
reconstruction are honest, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Let n′ be the number of applicants. Protocol 2 is
a (⌈(n′−1)/2⌉, q−ℓ
′
)-CISS protocol realizing access structure
A with secret space S and share space Si = F
(2n−1)ℓ′+2m−1
q .
Further, if the number t of cheaters satisfies t < ⌈(n′ − 1)/2⌉
and the set of honest players satisfies the access structure A,
the players agreeably reconstruct the secret S ∈ S.
Further, we can make a CDSS protocol by modifying
Protocol 2 in the following way,
Protocol 3 CDSS protocol
STEP 1: [Dealing] The same as Protocol 2.
STEP 2: [Sharing (Round 1)] The same as Protocol 2.
STEP 3: [Sharing (Round 2)] The same as Protocol 2.
STEP 4: [Detection] Each player applies respective individ-
ual identification. If there exists a player who individually
identifies at least one cheater, we consider that there exists
a cheater.
STEP 5: [Reconstruction] If no cheater is detected, the play-
ers reconstruct the secret from the collection of X ′i.
If there exists a player who individually identifies at least
one cheater, we consider that there exists a cheater. So, Pro-
tocol 2′ detects the existence of the cheaters with probability
1− q−l
′
as Fig. 1, which yields the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Let n′ be the number of applicants. Assume that
when a subset of [n] contains n′ elements, it satisfies the access
structure A. Protocol 3 is an (n′ − 1, q−ℓ
′
)-CDSS protocol
realizing access structure A with secret space S and share
space Si = F
(2n−1)ℓ′+2m−1
q . Further, if there is no cheater,
the players agreeably reconstruct the secret S ∈ S.
6Now, we consider the case when more than half players
collude together. We assume that only the j0-th player is
honest and that the majority cheaters (the j1-th player, ..., the
ja-th player) collude together. The cheater, the jv-th player
rewrites Tjv , Zjv ,jw and Yjv ,jw for 1 ≤ v ≤ a, 0 ≤ w ≤ a
so that Yjv ,jw = TjvXjw + Zjv ,jw for 1 ≤ w ≤ a and
Yjv ,j0 6= TjvXj0 + Zjv ,j0 . Due to the majority voting, the
agreed identification is that the honest player, the j0-th player
is a cheater. Therefore, when the majority make cheating, the
identification of our CISS protocol for agreed identification
is incorrect while our CDSS protocol detects the existence
of a cheater and the identification of our CISS protocol for
individual identification is correct, as Fig. 1.
VI. COMPARISON OF OVERHEAD
First, we compare the overhead of the protocol in [11] with
ours. Let u be the size of the share of the original secret
sharing protocol. Theorem 4 of [11] guarantees the success
probability is 1 − 2−ℓ when 2−ℓ > n2(n + 1)(u − 1)−1
and the size of the share of their CISS protocol is u4n+2.
That is, their overhead is u4n+1. Since u > n2(n + 1)2ℓ,
their overhead is greater than (n2(n+1))4n+12ℓ(4n+1). In our
case, we have u = qm and 2−ℓ = q−ℓ
′
. Hence, our overhead
is 2ℓ(2n−1)u
2m−1
m
−1 = 2ℓ(2n−1)u1−
1
m . Now, we consider the
case with m = 1 because Theorem 4 of [11] considers only
this case. Then, our overhead is 2ℓ(2n−1). Therefore, the their
exponential coefficient with respect to the security parameter
ℓ is twice as ours.
Next, we compare the overhead of the protocol in [1] with
ours. Since their protocol is specified to the (k, n)-threshold
scheme, we translate our overhead to the (k, n)-threshold
scheme. When the secret size is |S|, the conventional (k, n)-
threshold scheme has share size |S|p(n) for some polynomial
p. When we construct our CISS protocol based on this secret
sharing protocol, the share size is |S|p(n)2(2n−1)ℓqm−1. That
is, its exponential coefficient with respect to the security
parameter ℓ is still (2n − 1). In contrast, the (⌈k/2⌉, 2−ℓ)-
CISS protocol in [1] has share size (n − ⌈k/2⌉)n+k2(n+k)ℓ.
See Table 2 of [1] with ǫ = 2−ℓ and t = ⌈k/2⌉. That is, its
exponential coefficient with respect to the security parameter
ℓ is n+ k. So, when k is close to n, these two overheads are
almost the same.
VII. DISCUSSION
Firstly, we have proposed to explicitly distinguish CISS
protocols for individual identification from CISS protocols
for agreed identification. Then, attaching an message authen-
tication protocol to any existing secret sharing protocol, we
have universally constructed CISS protocols for individual
identification and agreed identification as well as a CDSS
protocol. Our CISS protocol for individual identification and
our CDSS protocol well work even when more than half of
the players involved in the reconstruction phase are cheaters.
Our CISS protocol for agreed well works when less than half
of the players in the reconstruction phase are cheaters. Our
protocols have computational complexity O(ℓ log ℓ) when the
probability of successfully identifying (detecting) the cheaters
is 1 − 2−ℓ. We can freely choose the security parameter ℓ
independently of the secret size and share size of the original
secret sharing protocol. Also, we do not use huge finite fields.
That is, we can realize any security parameter ℓ even with the
finite field F2. These characteristics simplify the realization.
We have checked that the overhead of our protocols are not so
huge in comparison with existing protocols. Indeed, although
our protocol has been given as a simple combination of a
message authentication [15], [18] and an existing secret shar-
ing, the proposed protocol achieves performances that had not
been realized in existing protocols (See Table 1). In this paper,
we have employed message authentication based on Toeplitz
matrix for simple performance analysis. We can generalize our
method with a general message authentication protocol, which
requires more complicated performance analysis.
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